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Abstract: In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a 
higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital 
production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and 
differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we 
also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill 
premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in 
income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale gr wth model.  
 
The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of 
the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a 
different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived 
in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted 
as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and 
physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. 
Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an 
increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to 
the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital 
tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of 
knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the 
various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the 
knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention. 
 
Key words: human capital, inequality, tax reform. 
JEL Classification: J31, O40 
  
Resum: En aquest article hem tractat d’analitzar el paper que la política fiscal pot 
tenir a l’hora d’estimular la participació dels diversos factors de producció en 
l’elaboració de capital humà a llarg termini. Amb la introducció d’un impost sobre 
el capital físic i la diferenciació de dos impostos, un sobre el sou procedent del 
treball o esforç físic, i un altre procedent del capital humà o de les diverses 
habilitats adquirides, també s’ha tractat de presentar una possible via per tal 
d’influir en la desigualtat, que hem mesurat mitjançant el skill premium. D’aquesta 
manera es vol relacionar un increment en el capital humà amb una davallada en la 
desigualtat a nivell de renda. Aquesta anàlisi s’ha dut a terme en el context dels 
models del tipus no escalar. 
 
El model és capaç de canviar la participació que els factors privats de producció 
tenen en cadascun dels dos sectors productius de què es compon l’economia, 
producció de béns finals i de capital humà, així com d’influir en la desigualtat de 
manera diferent segons es tracti d’un canvi impositiu o d’un altre. Els resultats fruit 
dels diferents exercicis de simulació que s’han realitzat ens mostren com una 
reducció de l’impost sobre el capital humà, que podria ésser interpretada com una 
davallada de la progressivitat del sistema, acaba incrementant tant la participació de 
l’esforç físic com del capital físic en la producció de coneixement o capital humà, 
així com també exercint una reducció de la desigualtat. Pel que fa a l’impost sobre 
el treball físic, val a dir que una reducció del mateix, que pot interpretar-se com un 
increment de la progressivitat, comporta un increment de la participació del treball 
físic en la producció de béns finals, així com un augment de la desigualtat. 
Finalment, una reducció de la imposició sobre el capital físic es tradueix en un 
decrement de la participació del capital físic en la producció de capital humà alhora 
que permet una davallada final de la desigualtat. Tanmateix, cap dels canvis 
impositius és capaç de canviar la participació del capital humà en la producció del 
mateix, fet que és mereixedor d’un estudi posterior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some economists see education and human capital acquisition as a good 
investment since it increases wages. Others, howev, confer it a consumption 
value. Actually, most countries’ personal tax codes treat household spending on 
human capital as consumption. In any case, studies on the effects of government 
tax policies on human capital accumulation are still quite limited. Conventional 
wisdom in the human capital literature (Ben-Porah, 1967; Boskin, 1974) tends to 
suggest that income taxes do not encourage human capital accumulation. Some 
authors find that labor income taxation may either have no effect or a positive 
effect on human capital accumulation. Boskin (1975) showed that since labor 
income taxation reduces both the return and cost of human capital investment by 
the same proportion, it has no effect on human capital accumulation. Heckman 
(1976) challenged this view arguing that an income tax depresses the interest 
rates and thus the costs of borrowing, hence encouraging human capital 
investment. He also showed that (physical) capital income taxation and labor 
income taxation might have completely different effects on human capital 
accumulation. The first one could have a positive influence on human capital 
based on the fact that taxation on physical capital encourages a substitution to 
human capital. 
 
One interesting aspect to take into account is the presence of uncertai ty in the 
return to human capital investment. Eaton and Rosen (1980) did so and found 
that a labor tax may improve welfare by decreasing risk. They showed that 
without uncertainty labor income taxation has no effect on human capital, but in 
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the presence of uncertainty labor income taxation may increase human capital. 
Later on, Lucas (1990) showed that income taxation lowers the return to human 
capital and reduces the incentive to accumulate human capital, reducing the 
hours worked. This reduction decreases the return to human capital investment. 
Stokey and Rebelo (1995) tend to confirm Lucas (1990) results in the sense that 
if human capital’s share is large in all sectors and if the production of human 
capital is lightly taxed, then taxing returns in the physical capital sector will have 
modest growth effects. 
 
Considering time as the principal input producing human capital, the primary 
cost of investing in human capital is forgone wages. Then, income taxation 
would reduce the net wage, which are both the returns on human capital 
investment as well as its primary cost. Taking this into account, most initial 
studies did not find a significant effect of taxation on human capital since they 
considered that taxation of wage income reduced the return and cost of human
capital by more or less the same proportion. However, Trostel (1993) considers 
that time is not the only input in the production of human capital, and includes 
some other inputs whose cost is not reduced by taxation, such as tuition. He finds 
that if taxation reduces only part of the cost of investing in human capital, then 
the cost reduction is lower than the return reduction, a fact that translates a tax 
increase into a lower accumulation of human capital. His results can be 
summarized saying that most of the long-run impact of taxation on effective 
labor supply occurs through human capital. Also, that capital income taxation 
has a small negative effect on human capital because of the fall in the gross wage 
rate. Thus, human capital accumulation is reduced mainly because of the wage 
tax component. More specifically, he found that a one-percent increase in the 
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income tax rate would cause the human capital stock to decline by 0.39% in the 
long-run.  
 
Some authors have also analyzed the effects caused by replacing one kind of tax 
by a different one on the long-run value of human capital. Davies and Whalley 
(1991) found small effects on human capital coming from replacing an income 
tax with a consumption tax because capital adjusts such that the after-tax in erest 
rate returns to approximately its original value. Dupor t al. (1996) also found 
that switching from an income tax to a consumption tax largely increases 
physical capital accumulation, but has only slightly positive effects on human 
capital. On the other hand, Ortigueira (1998), studied the implications of taxation 
policies in an endogenous growth model, concluding that the transitional period 
turns out to be highly relevant in evaluating the welfare cost of a tax reform. He 
also concludes that once the initial ratio of physical-human capital is fixed, the 
investment rate in human capital depends on the magnitude of the tax rate, which 
has a permanent effect on the level of the economy. 
 
Also, the way government sets aside tax revenues may influence the long-ru  
effects of taxation on capital accumulation. In this sense, Lin (1998) shows that 
with the tax revenues being used to compensate the individuals who pay taxes, 
an increase in the tax rate has no effect on human capital. However, if the tax 
revenues are consumed by the government, an increase in the labor income tax 
rate raises the real interest rate, lowers the present discounted value of the future 
income, reduces time allocated toward education, and decreases human capital. 
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In this paper we will try to analyze the way to foster a higher participation of the 
different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-
run by making fiscal policy quite specific, that is, adding various types of taxes. 
It seems that changing from an income tax to a wage tax is welfare improving, 
although a wage tax seems to increase wealth inequality, compared to the 
distributional neutrality of a consumption tax, as some authors have pointed out 
(see for instance Pecorino, 1994; Perroni, 1995, 1997; Felder, 1997). Taking this 
into account, we will examine the different influence that various types of taxes 
may exert on human capital accumulation as well as on inequality and economic 
growth in a non-scale growth model. In any case, the results derived in the paper 
attract attention to the fact that decreasing taxes on human and physical capital 
may end up positively influencing the accumulation of human capital and 
increasing the percentage of raw labor and physical capital devoted to the 
production of knowledge. But they attract attention especially to the fact that 
none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in 
the knowledge production. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the lit rature 
on taxation and human capital, with special attention to progressivity and its 
likely negative influence on human capital accumulation. Section 3 presents the 
non-scale model with specific taxation. Section 4 describes the general 
equilibrium and stationary states, and section 5 undertakes an analysis of the 
influence of different tax changes on inequality and some other economic 
variables. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
 
  5 
2. Progressivity and human capital 
 
Some of the main concerns about fiscal policy that exist nowadays are how 
economics should be used to evaluate and design tax changes; which tax changes 
are needed to restore the generational imbalance between young and elderly; 
specially in the US, some authors, like Karoly (1994) or Zee (1999) claim for a 
need of larger progressivity in order to reduce inequality. Karoly relies on a more 
progressive taxation system whenever some conditions are met, such as a certain 
degree of egalitarism on the welfare function, or on the distribution of 
endowments, or the level of responsiveness of labor supply to changes in the 
after tax wage rate that would be determining the value of efficiency costs. In 
this line, Zee looks at progressive taxation as a means of increasing the revenue 
to finance targeted transfers to the poor and lessening inequality programs. He 
mainly addresses the government problem of maximizing a social welfare 
function, which displays some degree of income inequality aversion. According 
to him richer people in poorer countries should be taxed heavier than richer 
people in richer countries. 
 
In any case, a vast part of the literature on taxes and human capital considers that 
progressive tax schedules are a tax on human capital accumulation, (Trostel, 
1993) since they reduce the after tax value of the future returns to education by 
more than it reduces the after tax value of the foregone labor market earnings. 
Hence, they may dissuade agents from investing in human capital.  
 
However, most of the analyses of capital income taxation have focused on the 
taxation of physical and financial capital, with lower attention to human capital 
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taxation. Conventional income tax is said to ignore changes in the value of 
human capital over time and to tax only realizations in the form of wages 
(Kaplow, 1996). The inclusion of human capital has arisen several questions, 
mainly trying to answer which is the impact on skill formation of proposals such 
as to switch from progressive taxes to flat income and consumption taxes. 
According to Boskin (1975), any human capital investment that increases future 
earnings enough to drive the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket may decrease the 
present value of the depreciation allowance to the present value of the 
incremental tax liability. So, investments that are profitable at the current tax rate 
may not be so when taking account of the increased future tax rate. He considers 
that the progressive tax rate structure of the personal income tax probably creates 
a disincentive to accumulate human capital. This disincentive might be more 
severe for secondary workers in two-earner families whose incremental incomes 
from human capital investment may generate a large increase in marginal tax 
rates. 
 
Moreover, a tax which lowers the after-tax r ntal rate on human capital, given 
the rate of interest and the price of any purchased inputs in human capital 
production, will decrease human capital investment. Boskin also considers 
important to note that the long-run supply of labor and the sensitivity of human 
capital to its return do affect the incidence of the tax. Boskin and Shoven (1980) 
challenge Schultz view, which mainly argued that the U.S. tax system 
discriminated against human capital investment, by underlining that the main 
point in Shultz view based on the lack of deductibility of expenditures on human 
capital was not correct, since the most important costs of human capital were 
foregone earnings, rather than tuition payments. However, if education caused a 
  7 
significant movement across tax brackets, then progressivity could be an 
important aspect to take into account in order for the agents to make their 
education decisions. According to Heckman et al. (1998) that is what happens, a 
progressive wage tax reduces the incentive to accumulate skills since human 
capital promotes earnings growth and moves persons to higher tax brackets. As a 
result, marginal returns on future earnings are reduced more than marginal costs 
of schooling. They analyze the effects of moving to a flat tax, eliminating 
progressivity in wages and stimulating skill formation. Their results show how 
the aggregate stock of high-school human capital declines, while the amount of 
college human capital increases resulting from a rise in college enrollment. 
 
On the other hand, Bovenberg and van Ewijk (1997) show that the introduction 
of overlapping generations induce non-n utrality of progressive taxation with 
respect to the decision to invest in human capital. They consider that with 
overlapping generations, progressive taxes decrease the expected growth of 
after-tax wages by transferring resources to future generations, which reduces the 
marginal value of accumulating additional human capital, and hence the 
incentives to invest. In fact, a progressive tax system transfers resources from the 
richer, older generations to the poorer, new ones, thereby reducing the growth of 
after-tax wages and thus harming the incentives to learn. According to 
Bovenberg and van Ewijk, without government intervention, intergenerational 
spillovers of human capital imply that households do not invest enough in human 
capital. Hence, by reducing the incentive to further investment, a progressive tax 
may exacerbate the distortions associated with those spillovers. Gordon and 
Tchilinguirian (1998) argue that the tax environment for the average production 
worker who invests tends to be slightly more advantageous than the tax 
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environment for the top-bracket investor, but that progressive tax codes do not 
translate neatly into progressive investment incentives. They refer to Sweden as 
one major example whose tax system creates a kind of education trap at income 
levels close to or below those of the average production worker, creating strong 
disincentives to invest in education, but it tends to be neutral for higher incomes. 
Thus, they argue that lowering progressivity could be a way to enhance 
incentives to invest in education, at least for medium income earners.  
 
 
3. Non-scale model. Individual optimization 
 
Consider an economy that comprises N ndividuals. The exogenous rate of 
population growth is constant at n. Each individual i produces output iY  using 
capital stock, iK , skills, iH  and public services provided by the government, G . 
This output production sector is subject to positive externalities arising from the 
aggregate stocks of physical capital, K, human capital, H, as well as government 
spending, G , according to the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
[ ] [ ] GHKKHN cSccbibibFi GHKKHY fyqa=  (1a) 
 
The individuals also produce new human capital, iJ , in another sector, also 
subject to positive externalities arising from the aggregate stock of physical 
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capital, K, and human capital, H, as shown by the following Cobb-D uglas 
production function: 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] HKKHN ffeieieJi HKKHaJ fyq ---= 111  (1b) 
 
Both production functions exhibit increasing returns in the private production 
factors and the externalities. All factors have positive marginal values, thus the 
only restrictions on productive elasticities are the following ones:  
 
;01;01
;0;01;01
>>>>
>>>>>
HK
GHK c
hh
ss
 
 
The public good is available equally to each individual, independently of the 
usage of others. The constants a
F ,  a J  represent exogenous technological shift 
factors to the production functions, while b i ,  ci ,  ei ,  fi  are the respective productive 
elasticities. Besides, each individual is endowed with a unit of labor, q  of which 
is allocated to the production of new output and (1 - q) to the production of new 
human capital. In addition, he allocates a fraction y  of his current human capital, 
Hi , to the production of final output, and the balance (1 -y )  to the accumulation 
of further human capital. Likewise, he allocates a fraction f  of his physical 
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capital, K i , to the production of final output and the rest (1 - f )  to he human 
capital sector.  
 
All agents in the economy are assumed to be identical so that aggregate and 
individual quantities are related by: 
 
iii NHHNKKNYY ººº ,,  (2) 
 
We also assume that the government sets its aggregate expenditure level, G, as a 
constant fraction, g, of aggregate output, Y, while government services derived 
by the individual are proportional to individual output, in accordance with: 
 
igNYgYG == ;   GS = gY (3) 
 
Hence, any further expansion in government expenditure will be modeled by an 
increase in the output share, g. 
 
Substituting (3) into (1a) we can rewrite the production function as: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )GGGHGKGKGHGN cccccccbicbicbFi NHKKHaY ------= 111111 fyq  (1a’) 
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where aF º a F g
c G( )
1
1 -cG .  
 
The rate at which the individual accumulates the two types of capital is des ribed 
by: 
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) iiiHhNwiKKki TCHrwKnrK ---+-+---= ytqtdft 111
.
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) iHffeieieJi HnHKHKaH HKHKN +----= dyfq 111
.
 
 
(4a) 
 
(4b) 
 
where: 
( ) K
Y
b
K
Y
b
K
Y
r K
i
i
K
i
i
K fff
==
¶
¶
=  
N
Y
b
Y
b
Y
w N
i
N
i
N qqq
==
¶
¶
=  
( ) H
Y
b
H
Y
b
H
Y
r H
i
i
H
i
i
H yyy
==
¶
¶
=  
(5a) 
 
(5b) 
 
(5c) 
 
According to (4a), raw labor wage is taxed at the rate wt , capital is taxed at kt , 
and skills are taxed at ht . In addition, we allow for lump-su  taxation, Ti . 
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The representative agent in the economy chooses individual consumption, Ci, the 
sectoral allocation of labor, physical and human capital, and the rates of physical 
and human capital accumulation to maximize his intertemporal utility function: 
 
( ) dteC ti r
g
g
-
-¥
ò-
1
01
1
           0>r ;           0>g  
(6) 
 
where r  denotes the constant rate of time preference. The constant elasticity 
utility function implies a constant elasticity of substitution equal to 
g
1 . The 
optimization will be subject to the production functions (1a)-(1b) and the 
accumulation constraints, (4a) - (4b). Note that in making its decisions, the 
household takes HNK rwr ,,  as given, though these are determined in equilibrium 
as in (5a)-(5c). Also, each agent takes G and the aggreate physical and human 
capital as given. The optimization is to maximize: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) úû
ù
êë
é -+----+-+-+
-
--
-
iiKiiiHhNwiKk
tti KKnTCHrwKrvee
C .
111
1
1
dytqtft
g
rr
g
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) úû
ù
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é -+----+ - iiH
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i
e
i
e
J
t HHnHKHKae HKHKN
.
111 dyfqm r  
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The following first order and transversality conditions are obtained: 
 
ii vC =
-g
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(7a) 
(7b) 
 
(7c) 
 
(7d) 
 
(7e) 
 
(7f) 
lim
t® ¥
n
i K ie
- rt = lim
t ®¥
m
i H i e
-rt = 0  (7g) 
 
where n i ,  mi  are the respective shadow values of physical capital and human 
capital. 
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4. The aggregate economy 
 
To derive the behavior of the aggregate economy we first sum (1a’) and (1b) 
over the N individuals in the economy. We may express the resulting quantities 
in terms of the aggregates:  
 
NHKHKN NHKaY sssF
sssyfq=  
( ) ( ) ( ) NHKHKN NHKaJ eeeJ hhhyfq ---= 111  
(8a) 
(8b) 
 
where: 
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We will assume that the government finances its expenditure in accordance with 
a balanced budget, which aggregated over N indi iduals, can be expressed as: 
 
iiiHhiKkNw gNYNTNHrNKrNw =+++ ytftqt  (9) 
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or, in terms of the aggregate quantities, iiii NTTNKKNHHNYY ºººº ,,, : 
 
gYTHrKrNw HhKkNw =+++ ytftqt  (9’) 
 
To complete the macroeconomic equilibrium, we must consider the aggregate 
accumulation of physical and human capital. To do this, note that: 
 
nHHNH
nKKNK
i
i
+=
+=
..
..
 
 
 
Multiplying the individual accumulation equations (4a) and (4b) by N and 
combining with the government budget constraint (9’), aggregate physical and 
human capital in the economy are accumulated according to the product market 
equilibrium conditions: 
 
(1 ) KK g Y C Kd= - - -&  
HH J Hd= -&  
(10a) 
(10b) 
where Y, J  are defined in (8a), (8b), above. 
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4.1 Balanced equilibrium behavior 
According to the stylized empirical facts (Romer 1986), we assume that the 
output/capital ratio, Y/K, is constant. Thus, taking the differentials of the 
production functions (8a) and (8b), and solving, we obtain: 
 
ˆ H =
h
N (1 -s K ) +s NhK
(1 - hH )(1 -s K ) -s HhK
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú n º b Hn  
ˆ K = ˆ Y = ˆ C =
s N (1 - hH ) + sH hN
(1 - hH )(1 -s K ) -s H hK
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú n º b K n  
(11a) 
 
(11b) 
 
and thus per capita growth rate of output (capital) is: 
 
( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) KHKH
KNHHKNHH n
nY
hssh
hhhssssh
---
-+++-++-
=-
11
111
ˆ  
(11c) 
 
 
4.2 Dynamics of a two-sector model 
 
To derive the equilibrium dynamics around the balanced growth path we define 
the following stationary variables:  
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y º Y N b K ;  k º K N b K ;  c º C N b K ;  h º H N b H ;   j º J N b H ;  q º n mN ( bH - bK ) .  
 
For convenience, we shall refer to y, k, c, and h as scale-adjusted quantities. This 
allows us to rewrite scale-adjusted output and human capital as:  
 
KHHKN khay sssF
ssyfq=  
j = a J (1 -q )
e N (1 -y )eH (1 - f)e K hhH k hK  
(12a) 
(12b) 
 
The optimality conditions then enable the dynamics to be expressed in terms of 
these scale-adjusted variables, as follows. First, substituting (12a) and (12b) into 
the labor allocation condition, (7b), the human capital llo tion condition, (7c), 
and the physical capital allocation condition, (7d), yields the three relationships: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeNJsssNFw hhss fyqfyqt ---=-
-- 1111 11  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeHJsssHFh hhss fyqfyqt ---=- -- 1111 11  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) KHKHNKHKHN kheakhqba eeeKJsssKFk hhss fyqfyqt 11 1111 -- ---=-  
(13a) 
(13b) 
(13c) 
 
 
In principle, we can solve these three relationships for the allocation of labor, 
human capital, and physical capital across sectors: 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )khqkhw ,,,1,1,1 tttqq ---=  
( ) ( ) ( )( )khqkhw ,,,1,1,1 tttyy ---=  
( ) ( ) ( )( )khqkhw ,,,1,1,1 tttff ---=  
(14a) 
(14b) 
(14c) 
 
 
Using the optimality conditions, the dynamics of the system can be expressed in 
terms of the redefined stationary variables by: 
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(15a) 
 
(15b) 
 
(15c) 
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The steady state to this system, denoted by "~" superscripts, can be summarized 
by: 
 
 
(1 - g) ˜ y 
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(16a) 
 
(16b) 
 
(16c) 
 
(16d) 
 
plus allocation conditions: 
 
( ) jeybq NNw ~~1
~~1~ qq
t
-
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(17a) 
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These seven equations determine the equilibrium as follows: 
1. 
h
j
~
~
 is determined by (16b) 
2. Given 
h
j
~
~
, (16d) jointly with (16c) determine y~, which is independent of 
taxes. 
3. Given y~, equation (17c) determines q~, and given q~, equation (17b) 
determines f~.
4.  Given 
h
j
~
~
, y~ and f~, (16c) determines 
k
y
~
~
. 
5. Given 
k
y
~
~
, (16a) determines 
k
c
~
~
. 
6. Given 
k
y
~
~
, 
h
j
~
~
 and fq ~,~ ,y~, the two scale-adjusted production functions 
determine the stocks of human and physical capital, kh ~,~  and therefore cjy ~,~,~ . 
7. Finally, (17a) determines q~. 
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The key point to observe is that the steady-state equilibrium growth rates as well 
as the long-run allocation of human capital are independent of any of the tax 
rates. However, the equilibrium sectoral asset allocations, q~ and f~, are both 
influenced by ht . Besides, q
~is influenced by wt and f
~ is influenced by kt . 
Moreover, it is interesting to know that the long-run allocation of human c pital 
to the manufacturing sector, y~, is not influenced by any tax change. 
 
 
5. Simulations and wage premium responses to tax reforms  
 
In this section we will use the different simulations in order to analyze a way to 
foster a higher participation of the different productive factors in the human 
capital production sector in the long-run. Besides, we are also interested in 
seeking for a possible way to reduce inequality. 
 
We will measure income inequality in terms of the wage premium of skilled to 
unskilled workers, w R defined by: 
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(18) 
 
where HN rw ,  are the marginal products of unskilled workers and skills, 
respectively, representing the returns to raw labor and the retur s to skills. 
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It is interesting to note that the presence of both a tax on raw labor wage, wN , 
and a tax on skills return, Hr , could be seen as an easy way to introduce 
progressivity in the model, since unskilled workers will be taxed exclusively on 
their base salary, ( )wt , whereas skilled workers will be taxed both on their base 
salary, ( )wt , as well as on the returns of their skills, ( )ht . Hence, we can interpret 
wt  and ht  as the two tax brackets in a progressive tax system. 
 
Table 1 reports the values we employ for our fundamental parameters. These 
values are generally consistent with those suggested by previous calibration 
exercises (Lucas, 1988; Jones, 1995; Ortigueira and Santos, 1997). In these first 
simulations, externalities are set to zero in both sectors, except for the ones 
coming from government spending ( )Gc . Thus, in this paper we will start from a
situation where both production functions exhibit constant returns to scale in the 
private factors of production.  
 
 
Table 1. Benchmark parameters 
Production parameters 
20.0;35.0;45.0;04.0
;25.0;20.0;55.0;1
;2083.0
;3646.0;4687.0;92.0;1
====
=======
==
======
HKNG
HHKKNNJ
HH
KKNNFF
bbbc
eeea
s
ssa
hhh
s
ssa
 Preference parameters 25.2,04.0 == gr  
Depreciation and population  015.0,05.0,05.0 === nHK dd  
Fiscal policy parameters %35%,20%,30,15.0 ==== hkwg ttt  
 
 
 
The model adopts the following key benchmark equilibrium values, as reported 
in table 2. The share of labor allocated to the production of final output is about 
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86%, the share of physical capital allocated to production is 94 % and about 15% 
of the skills are used in the education sector. The implied equilibrium output-
capital ratio is 0.35, and the consumption-out ut ratio is 0.66, both of which are 
highly plausible. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Benchmark equilibrium values 
wt  kt  ht  q
~ f~ y~ KY /~  YC /~  
30% 20% 35% 0.8594 0.9372 0.8473 0.3461 0.6591 
 
 
Given that the equilibrium dynamics are generated by a fourth-order system, we 
know from Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) that the transition may be characterized 
by significant non-monotonicites in the state variables. This implies that both the 
starting point of the economy and the size of the tax cuts may have a certain 
influence on the actual transition to the new steady state. Hence, from now on, 
we will explore how successful this model is in representing a more specific 
fiscal policy thanks to the inclusion of various types of taxes, and also in 
explaining the evolution of inequality and the allocation of different productive 
factors after each fiscal shock. In order to do that, we will undertake three 
different tax cuts, a human capital tax cut, a raw labor wage one, and a physical 
capital one, and we will analyze the economic implications of each of them. We 
will start analyzing the dynamics predicted by the model after a human capital 
tax cut from 35% to 30%. The model predicts a new steady state as reported in 
table 3.  
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Table 3. Tax reform (human capital) equilibrium values 
wt  kt  ht  q
~ f~ y~ KY /~  YC /~  
30% 20% 30% 0.8502 0.9327 0.8473 0.3444 0.6581 
 
 
 
Note that this experiment can be seen as a reduction in the progressivity of the 
system. More specifically, we have ended up equalizing both the raw labor wage 
and the skills wage, hence eliminat ng progressivity somehow. 
 
This steady state differs from the benchmark both in the share of labor and 
physical capital allocation as well as in the capital output and the consumption 
output ratios. Although the growth rates of the endogenous factors a d the share 
of human capital allocated across sectors change only during the transition, the 
share of labor allocated to the final output (manufacturing) sector ends up 
decreasing by 1% and the share of physical capital by 0.5%. The output to 
capital ratio declines by about 0.5% and the consumption to output ratio by less, 
0.15%. The phase diagram in figure 1A shows that the human capital tax cut 
initially enhances the accumulation of human capital at the expense of physical 
capital. Figure 1C shows that scale adjusted per capita human capital growth 
rises to above 2% during the early stages after which it falls rapidly down 
towards its long-run steady state. Scale adjusted per physical capital capita 
growth, however, has a completely different pattern. After its initial decline it 
slightly overshoots its long-ru  growth rate and eventually rises the return of 
investing in physical capital sufficiently relative to the return on human capital. 
The initial accumulation of human capital attracts more resources d voted to the 
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knowledge production sector and away from the output production sector. We 
can see that from the initial decrease in the shares of labor, physical and human 
capital in the manufacturing sector, as shown in the appe dix A.1. In addition, 
under the assumption HH hs < , the initial increase in knowledge further serves to 
drive the allocation of factors to the human capital sector. Over time, as the 
growth rate of human capital decreases and the growth rate of physical capital 
increases, the allocation of factors to the human capital sector declines (the 
allocation to the manufacturing sector increases). It does so in such a way that 
we end up with the same human capital share in manufacturing as the one we 
had previous to the tax cut. 
 
If we now analyze the evolution of the income inequality, regarding (18), it is 
quite intuitive to think that the initial large decrease in the shares of raw labor 
and human capital devoted to the output production sector quite offset each 
other, and it is the initial big increase in human capital the one that initially 
drives the skill premium down. Recalling (13) and (14), we see that on impact a 
decrease in ht  has two effects on employment and skills in the final output 
sector, q , y . First, given q, it increases the after-tax relative price of final output, 
( )hq t-1 , thereby increasing q  and y . But at the same time, it r duces the before-
tax relative price q causing an offsetting reduction in q  and y . Over time, labor 
and skills will continue to move in response to the changing shadow value, as 
well as to the changing relative stocks of physical and human capital. Moreover, 
during the early phases of the adjustment q may continue to decline, thereby 
offsetting the effect of the accumulating human capital stock.  
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Figure 1.A. Growth rates of output, capital, and human capital 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the economy after a human capital tax cut 
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Figure 1(ctd.) Evolution of the economy after a human capital tax cut 
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Furthermore, as the growth rate of human capital slows down, the kill premium 
starts increasing. Then, it remains for several periods below the path followed in 
a situation with no tax decrease, thus inducing a lower value for inequality. In 
sum, devoting more labor and physical capital resources to the production of 
skills relative to the production of final output seems to increase the base wage 
received by an unskilled worker relative to the skills return. 
 
The second experiment consists in a raw labor wage tax cut from 30% to 25%. 
The model predicts a new steady state as shown in table 4. We could see this 
case as opposed to the previous change in the sense that by reducing the raw 
labor wage tax we end up increasing progressivity. 
 
 
Table 4. Tax reform (raw labor wage) equilibrium values. 
wt  kt  ht  q
~ f~ y~ KY /~  YC /~  
25% 20% 35% 0.8675 0.9372 0.8473 0.3461 0.6591 
 
 
This steady state differs from the benchmark only in the share of labor allocation 
but neither in the capital output nor in the consumption output ratios. Whereas 
the growth rates of the endogenous factors and the h res of capital and human 
capital allocated across sectors change only during the transition, the share of 
raw labor allocated to the final output sector increases by 1%. 
 
 
  29 
 
 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
time
-0.01
-0.005
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
growth rates
Figure 2.A. Growth rates of output, capital, and human capital 
 
 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140
time
0.00025
0.0005
0.00075
0.001
0.00125
0.0015
0.00175
0.002
growth rates
 
Figure 2.B. Growth rate of physical capital 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the economy after a raw labor wage tax cut 
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Figure 2.C. Adjustment dynamics 
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Figure 2(ctd.) Evolution of the economy after a raw labor wage tax cut 
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The phase diagram in figure 2A shows how the raw labor wage tax cut initially 
fosters the accumulation of physical capital as can also be seen from the 
evolution of adjusted per capita physical and human capital rates of growth in 
figure 2C. Adjusted per capita physical capital growth rate rises above 2% 
immediately after the tax decreas  and it goes down rapidly. However, the 
evolution of human capital follows a decreasing path until reaching its new long-
run value. 
 
When looking at the evolution of the skill premium, as before, the initial large 
decrease in q  and y  tend to offset each other and hence it is the initial large 
decline in human capital the main factor driving the increase in the skill 
premium immediately after the wage tax decrease. After some periods of 
adjustment the skill premium starts decreasing for a long time. Yet, it remains 
above the path followed by the skill premium simulated without any tax change 
for several periods. Thus, devoting more labor resources to the production of 
output we may end up decreasing the raw labor wage relative to the skills return, 
and hence increasing income inequality. 
 
The third experiment consists in a physical capital tax decrease from 20% to 
15%. The model predicts a new steady state as shown in table 5. 
 
This steady state differs from the benchmark one in the share of physical capital 
allocation as well as in the capital output and the consumption output ratios. In 
this case, the share of physical capital allocated to the final output 
(manufacturing) sector increases by 0.4%, the output to capital ratio declines by 
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about 5.5% and the consumption to output ratio by 1.7%. Hence, as the tax on 
physical capital falls, the accumulation of physical capital increases, since saving 
has become more attractive. 
 
 
Table 5. Tax reform (physical capital) equilibrium values. 
wt  kt  ht  q
~ f~ y~ KY /~  YC /~  
30% 15% 35% 0.8594 0.9407 0.8473 0.3270 0.6480 
 
 
According to the phase diagram in figure 3A, a physical capital tax decrease 
starts stimulating the accumulation of physical capital at the expense of human 
capital accumulation. Figure 3C shows how during the immediate periods 
following the physical capital tax decrease, scale adjusted per capita capital 
growth rises to around 2%, then, it starts going down towards its long-run value. 
With respect to scale adjusted per ca ita human capital growth rate, it starts 
being negative at the very beginning followed by a slight but continuous 
increase. Given this, we can say that the initial accumulation of physical capital 
attracts more resources devoted to the output production sector, and the shares of 
labor, physical and human capital in the final good production sector face a large 
initial increase. Over time, as the growth rate of physical capital decreases and 
the growth rate of human capital increases, the allocation offactors to the output 
production sector declines. Eventually, the shares of labor and human capital 
undershoot their long-run value, but they finally end up with the same value they 
had previous to the shock, being the share of physical capital the only one that 
finishes with a higher value in the manufacturing sector. In sum, we can see from 
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figure 3A that physical capital taxation has a small and negative effect on human 
capital, in line with Trostel (1993). 
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Figure 3.A. Growth rates of output, capital, and human capital
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Figure 3.B. Growth rate of physical capital 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of the economy after a physical capital tax cut 
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Figure 3 (ctd.) Evolution of the economy after a physical capital tax cut 
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Under this situation, the skill premium shows a short and fast initial increase, 
coinciding with a quite large and also fast initial decrease in human capital. 
Next, it starts decreasing during some periods following a subsequent increase in 
human capital. Even though during the first periods following the physical 
capital tax cut the skill premium remains above the skill premium associated to a 
situation with no physical capital tax change, it very soon d creases below the 
no-tax change skill premium value, remaining like that for several periods. This 
allows us to say that a physical capital tax cut leads to a long-run decrease in 
inequality. In sum, devoting more physical capital resources to the produc i n of
output relative to the production of human capital allows us to come up with an 
income inequality that ends up following a lower trajectory than the one 
followed without the tax cut. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by 
the skill premium. In the context of non-scale models, we have introduced 
various types of taxes in order to make fiscal policy more specific. To be more 
precise, we have introduced a tax on physical capital, a tax on skills and a tax on 
raw labor wage. The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors 
devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, 
and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. 
We have also tried to detail the impact of fiscal policy on the transitional 
dynamics. In fact, the presence of capital and raw labor in the human capital 
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technology opens a route for the influence of different types of taxes on the long-
run allocation of labor, physical and human capital, among the knowledge and 
output production sectors.  
 
A human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in 
progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital 
devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality by lowering 
the path followed by the skill premium. Given that the net returns on skills are 
larger after the tax decrease, we can think that the human capital tax cut may 
foster the relative production of human capital and it does so by devoting a 
higher percentage of the productive factors, N nd K to it. Moreover, a raw labor 
wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the 
progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the 
production of final output and increases the path followed by the skill premium. 
Since the net return on raw labor wage is larger than before the tax decrease, this 
reduction in the wage tax may disincentive the relative production of human 
capital. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical 
capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality 
value than the one achieved without changing the fiscal policy. However, it is 
interesting to note that none of the taxes we have introduced influences the long-
run allocation of human capital to the two production sectors, quite a provocative 
result. We might have to introduce a tax or a subsidy directly on the production 
of human capital o have such an effect here. Nevertheless, even if a subsidy may 
be more efficient than direct government expenditures, it may undesirably alter 
the distribution of tax burdens. Besides, the choice of the optimal rate of subsidy 
requires balancing effici ncy and distributional equity as said by Aaron and 
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Boskin (1980). These authors go on saying that in an economy in which 
individuals have different wage rates and different tastes, a subsidy may be 
optimal in some income classes and demographic groups but not in others. In the 
presence of externalities, for instance, it may be best to concentrate subsidies on 
groups with high price elasticities. On the other hand, educational investment 
subsidies, as said by Steuerle (1996), may operate like investment tax cr dits for
physical capital investment, that is, favoring short-lived over long-lived capital. 
Lin and Russo (1999) also suggest that in many countries that have attempted to 
encourage R&D with subsidies and have paid for them by raising taxes, those 
subsidies may have discouraged rather than encouraged growth. Extrapolating 
this result to human capital, we should be aware of the pernicious consequences 
of subsidization when implementing any kind of subsidy.  
 
One final remark would be that once a progressivity duction has taken place 
with the subsequent increase in human capital accumulation and thus some 
efficiency gains, government could use some complementary instruments aimed 
at redistributing those efficiency gains across generations, increasing the number 
of households who benefit from it. But then it comes the problem of 
subsidization again. 
 
Finally, a broad discussion on how changes in externalities, government 
expenditures, etc. will affect the transition, growth, inequality and so on, using 
the formulation in this paper as benchmark is in our immediate future agenda. In 
any case, the framework presented in this paper could be a likely avenue for 
government policy to influence long-run inequality in a non-scale economy. The 
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present model and its simulative results provide an operational framework within 
which future policy inequality issues can be addressed.
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Appendix. Graphical evolution of the shares of labor, physical capital and 
human capital in the manufacturing sector after a tax change. 
 
A.1. Human capital tax decrease from 35% to 30%. 
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A.2. Raw labor wage tax decrease from 30% to 25%. 
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A.3. Physical capital tax decrease from 20% to 15%. 
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